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ALIEN THOUGHTS: A COMMENT
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
SCHOLARSHIP
ALLAN

C.

HUTCHINSON*

As the only non-American at the Symposium, I have been placed
in an ambivalent position. While my lack of any intimate dealings
with the American system of constitutional governance might be
thought to weaken some of my comments, it also gives them a certain
freshness and detachment that some of the other commentators' observations might lack. Although I am familiar with American jurisprudential materials, I had not previously had any first-hand experience of
American scholarly debate. Its intellectual passion and energy cannot
be questioned, but its focus and relevance leave room for comment. To
be blunt, there is a distressing tendency to treat peculiarly late twentieth-century American jurisprudential difficulties as fundamental issues
of universal human significance. Taking advantage of my alien status,
I intend to stand outside the ethnocentric American tradition and offer
some critical observations on the contemporary jurisprudential
enterprise.
I. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
The hallmark of American constitutional scholarship is its obsessive quality and character. Although the scholarly debate appears sophisticated and assured, it is energized by a growing sense of
desperation. American scholars struggle to offer some theoretically
valid account of the jurisprudential enterprise. As part of the larger
political project of modern liberalism, lawyers seek to establish the distinctiveness of legal discourse, the centrality of the adjudicative enterprise and, more generally, the pivotal importance of the Constitution in
*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. LL.B 1974,

London University; LL.M 1978, Manchester University. I am grateful to my colleagues, especially Ed Belobaba and Jamie Cameron, who tried to dissuade me from these views. Although

they did not convince me, I benefited greatly from their critical comments.
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American politics and history.I The history of American jurisprudence
can be characterized by its ambition to explain the legitimate role and
responsibilities of the judiciary within a constitutional democracy. The
contemporary concern has been to provide an adjudicative paradigm
that discloses how judges can and should have a structured and constrained resort to political morality. 2 In the 1970's, the discipline of economics seemed to offer a solution, but scholars became disenchanted
with its pseudo-scientific claims. Eager for fresh insight, legal scholars
turned to other extra-legal pursuits. The 1980's promises to be the decade of legal hermeneutics. 3 This present excursion into the world of
interpretative practices is fascinating. However, the zeal with which
many prominent constitutional scholars have thrown themselves into
this hermeneutical debate is troubling.
Whatever other differences they may have, many of the symposiasts are united in their belief that something important is at stake when
they argue about which theory of interpretation is to be adopted and
followed. In general terms, I tend to agree with Stanley Fish and Walter Benn Michaels that legal interpretation is not an activity in need of
restraint; 4 interpretation is only possible because there is already, and
always in place, some interpretative strategy which "renders unavailable the independent or uninterpreted text and renders unimaginable
the independent and freely interpreting reader."5 My present concern
operates at a much less abstract and more concrete level. 6 It is a central, but largely unexplored, assumption in the debate that the institution of judicial review has made a significant and substantive difference
1. See Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars.- The Unfolding Drama ofAmerican Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. R-V. 199 (1984).
2. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984).
3. This dabbling in hermeneutics is nothing new. See, e.g., F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1839). This monograph is very powerful and remains a relatively sophisticated analysis of legal interpretation. Its study would repay many of the present "legal
hermeneutics" enthusiasts. For instance, Lieber argues that:
[The very nature and essence of human language, being... not a direct communion of

minds, but a communion by intermediate signs only, renders a total exclusion of every
imaginable misapprehension, in most cases, absolutely impossible.
Literal interpretation ought to mean of course, that which takes the words in their literal
sense, which is hardly ever possible, since all human language is made up of tropes,
allusions, images, expressions relating to erroneous conceptions, etc. for instance, the sun

rises.
Id. at 27, 66.
4. For further comments on this subject, see infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
5. Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationin Law andLiterature,60 TEX. L. REV.
551, 562 (1982).
6. For a more abstract discussion, see Hutchinson & Monahan, The "Jights"Stu.- Roberto
Unger and Beyond, 62 TaX. L. REv. 1477 (1984).
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to American society. In more practical terms, it is assumed that the

United States Supreme Court, as the official constitutional interpreter,
has played a major role in shaping the content and quality of life for
Americans. If the struggle over constitutional interpretative theory is
to have any bite, it must be demonstrated that the United States would
be a substantively different country without the institution of judicial
review. As heretical as it might seem, it is my contention that judicial
review has not played the central role many legal scholars claim or
wish that it has. The interpretive activities of the courts with regard to
the Constitution and the resulting scholarship have been marginal to
social life.
In making this claim, it is important to emphasize what I am not
saying. I am not suggesting that judicial review has had no impact. To
make such a mistake would be to fall into the same trap of making
exaggerated claims as the traditional scholars do. There is a distinctly
American culture of constitutional argument and rhetoric. American
political dialogue has its own tone and style; the Supreme Court has
been an important participant in this constitutional conversation.7
Also, it would be foolish to deny the powerful symbolic function of
constitutional adjudication in the United States. Clearly, the Supreme
Court is a major institution in the ritual and ceremony of American
governance.' Furthermore, it has had an important impact on the
structure of governance. 9 Notwithstanding all these roles, judicial review, as opposed to adjudication generally, has played a minor part in
the substantive development and organization of American life. Without the help or hindrance of a constitutional mandate, American judges
would have found a way to reach much the same decisions as arrived at
under the guise of constitutional adjudication.
These "off-the-wall" claims might be considered to derive from
willful ignorance or plain stupidity. Such allegations demand strong
support and substantiation. The limiting confines of a Comment make
a thorough accomplishment of that task impossible. The best I can
hope for is to make a strong prima facie case and cast some real doubt
on the validity and solidity of constitutional scholarship's foundational
premises. After some general comments, I will look to the Anglo-Ca7. See J.B. WHrrE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54. A powerful argument for the crucial cultural
significance of "social symbolism" is made by Clifford Geertz in C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

(1983).
9. The Supreme Court's decisions on legislative reapportionment schemes offer a good illustrationn of this. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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nadian legal tradition and its doctrinal history and, also, to revealing
data on contemporary American society.
II. ANGLO-CANADIAN DOCTRINE
Neither Canada nor England possesses a constitution in the sense
of one with an entrenched Bill of Rights, 10 but the substance and trends
of contemporary governmental practice in both countries is markedly
similar. Aside from the argumentative style and attitude, topical legal
concerns and conclusions of all three countries are surprisingly close.
In the broadest terms, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom share a common and basic economic structure. Each remains organized around the institutions of private property and private
enterprise. While there no longer thrives a crude form of laissez-faire
capitalism, all three countries remain committed to industrial profitability. To varying degrees, the trappings of the welfare state have been
added and a large public sector, subject to increasing government regulation, has developed. Nonetheless, the vast majority of wealth and
power is still wielded by private interests. These basic economic arrangements dictate the general shape of social and political life.
Of course, there are significant differences between the United
Kingdom and the United States, but it is difficult to attribute these to
the existence of judicial review alone. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
been very reluctant to intervene in governmental action on economic
grounds. For instance, the "equal protection" doctrine has recently
been applied so that a wealth classification need only meet a "minimal
rationality" standard rather than a "compelling state interest" test."
Such crude generalizations may be dismissed, quite rightly, as lacking
any lawyerly precision or detail. Accordingly, I will concentrate on a
particular and topical aspect of legal doctrine, namely due process, and
explore the comparative responses of American and Anglo-Canadian
judges to the relations between bureaucracy and citizens. The intention
is not to present American and Anglo-Canadian doctrine as being
clone-like, but to emphasize that the Anglo-Canadian courts' lack of
10. Canada has recently taken this "fateful" step. It has possessed a federally legislated Bill
of Rights for the past twenty years. However, the effect of the new constitutional change remains
unclear. Moreover, the Canadian Charter allows particular legislation to be put beyond the reach
of its provisions. Needless to say, I believe that the Charter's effect will be more rhetorical than
substantive. See Hutchinson, OfKings andDefty Rascals: The StruggleforDemocracy, 9 QUEENS
L.J. 273, 282 (1984).
11. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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any formal constitutional power of judicial review has not prevented
them from developing similar doctrines.
Under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, federal and state governments must not deprive persons "of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law." Prior to 1970, courts utilized a simple one-step
process in which a "fair" procedure had to be observed by the government if its actions conflicted with substantive constitutional rights or
"those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common
and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors,
which were shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political
condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this
country."' 2 This procedure basically required notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to any government deprivation.13 Although
"property" was liberally interpreted, it did not encompass public office
or employment.14 In 1970, in response to the rapid growth of the public sector, the range of interests protected was expanded. In Goldberg v.
Kelp,15 the Supreme Court held that New York could not terminate
"public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording
him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination."' 6
Also, the variable standard of due process requirements was re-emphasized. In the last few years, however, courts have taken a much less
to the interests protected and the amount of due
generous approach
17
process afforded.
In the 1982 term, for instance, the Supreme Court handed down
two decisions on the procedural rights of prisoners, a particularly powerless social group. On a restrictive interpretation of earlier cases, it
decided that there existed only narrow and minimal procedural restrictions on changes to prisoners' conditions of confinement. In Hewitt v.
Helms,'8 a review of a prisoner's "misconduct report" was made by a
prison committee outside his presence. He was placed in solitary confinement and no further review occurred for seven weeks. The court
decided that in balancing the prisoner's interests against those of prison
administration, "informal, nonadversary evidenciary review [was] suffi12. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
13. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
14. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16. Id at 255.
17. See Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fundamental Values and ProceduralSafeguards in ConstitutionalRight to Hearing Cases, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv.301 (1979).
18. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
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cient."' 1 9 Also, in Ohim v. Wakinekona,2 0 the Court determined that,

although "prisoners retain a residuum of liberty," 2' an alleged breach
of Hawaii's prison regulations concerning the composition of independent review committees did not offend the due process
requirements.
In Anglo-Canadian law, the signal achievement for many, over the
past two decades, has been the rise of administrative law, especially the
vibrant doctrine of judicial review. Indeed, the judicial review of bureaucratic activity has developed at much the same pace and in much
the same direction as American "due process" law.2 2 Prior to the
1960's, the courts enforced a very light regime of procedural requirements for governmental invasion of a limited range of interests, mainly
focusing upon property rights. 23 Indeed, in 1939, John Willis stated
that:
[T]he lack of any constitutional limitation on administrative procedure has been supplied by "judicial legislation. . . ." We can only
conclude that, despite the absence of a Bill of Rights, English and
Canadian judges have succeeded [by means of a spurious technique
of statutory interpretation] in evolving a control over administrative
action that bears comparison with the due process clause. Let us, in
default of a better name, call it the Pseudo Bill of Rights. 24
However, the real explosion in the doctrine of "natural justice"
occurred in the 1960's. Prompted by the legislative introduction of
minimal procedural standards in 1957, the courts launched a full scale
assault on bureaucratic maladministration. In the seminal case of Ridge
v. Baldwin,2" the House of Lords decided that instead of searching for
some "super-added" duty to act judicially in exercising a legislatively
conferred power,2 6 a duty to act judicially was to be inferred from the
nature of the power being exercised. There now exists a relatively low
19. Id at 476 (Rehnquist, J.).
20.
21.

460 U.S. 238 (1983).
Id at 245.

22.

The leading texts are J. EVANS, Dc SMITH'S JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AC-

TION (4th ed. 1980) and H. WADE,ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1982). For a more critical
account of these developments, see J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1983)
and Hutchinson, The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarshi, 48 MOD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1985).
23. See, e.g., Knapman v. Board of Health, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 760; Cooper v. Board of Works,
143 Eng. Rep. 414 (1863).
24. Willis, AdministrativeLaw and the British North AmericaAct, 53 HARV. L. REV. 251, 281
(1939).
25. 1964 A.C. 40.
26. See Rex v. Church Assembly Legislative Comm., [1928] 1 K.B. 411.
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threshold for the imposition of a duty to act judicially. However, despite this general expansion of "due process," the courts have begun to
retreat from their earlier promises.
For instance, as in the United States, the issue of prisoners' rights
has troubled the English courts. In a recent series of cases,2 7 AngloCanadian courts have arrived at similarly ambivalent conclusions to
their American counterparts. Although there is a general duty to act
fairly, it does not necessarily carry with it rights to the observance of
full "due process." As in Olim, prison regulations have been held to be
declaratory, rather than mandatory, and their breach does not per se
offend the rules of natural justice. Also, in circumstances close to Hewit, it was held that although the disciplinary body must act fairly, there
was no right to representation or appearance.2 8 These doctrinal developments represent a microcosm of general Anglo-Canadian administrative law. As some leading commentators have concluded, "[t]he
constitutional differences between Canada and the United States have
not prevented considerable similarities in issues, reasoning, and results,
and we doubt that they have required the differences that also exist."2 9
III.

JUDICIAL PRACTICE INDEPENDENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION

Nevertheless, American scholars may object that while this conclusion is all well and good, the Anglo-Canadian courts cannot strike
down legislation and must comply with parliamentary opinions on
"due process." In high constitutional theory, this is correct. But judicial practice is something very different." The best illustration is the
courts' response to the enactment of "privative clauses" which seek to
oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. In the face of dogged
legislative determination, the courts have refused to vacate their administrative turf. The privative clause is to legislative-judicial relations
"what the Maginot Line was to military tactics: a virtually impregnable legislative project of defence, designed to protect the [administrative process] from frontal assault. And now it has suffered the same
27. See Martineau v. Matsqui Inst. Disciplinary Bd., [1980] S.C.R. 602 (Can.); Raymond v.
Honey, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 465 (H.L.); Regina v. Board of Visitors, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1401; Williams v.
Home Office, [1981] I AU E.R. 1211 (Q.B.D.); Guiffoyle v. Home Office, [1981] 1 Q.B. 309.
28. See Williams, [1981] 1 All E.R. at 1247.
29. J. EVANS, H. JANISCH, D. MULLAN & R. RISK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT
AND MATERIALS 28 (1980).

30.

See J. EVANS, supra note 22, at 357-80.
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fate. It has been outflanked by a judicial panzer attack, a virtual con' 31
stitutional blitzkrieg.
The courts have construed preclusive provisions so as to limit,
rather than debar, judicial involvement. While feigning deference to
legislative intent, the courts' sweeping power to review on jurisdictional
grounds remains intact no matter how precise or encyclopaedic the
privative clause may be. For instance, in Anisminic v. ForeignCompensation Commission,32 the House of Lords held that a statutory provision
directing that "[t]he determination by the [foreign compensation] commission of any application made to them.

. .

shall not be called in

question in any court of law" did not oust the supervisory jurisdiction
of the courts. 3 The courts have managed to achieve this result by
viewing it as "a straight-forward problem of statutory interpretation. 34
The basic force of this position is that any error of law puts the tribunal
outside its jurisdiction and places it within the supervisory jurisdiction
of the courts. The constitutional rhetoric may be of constitutional partners, but the practice is of constitutional competitors. The ghost of
Lord Coke is alive and well in Anglo-Canadian courts. 5
I need not labor the point of this crude comparative exercise. Similar doctrinal developments and practice have occurred in legal systems
that do not possess a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. The
major determinants of legal change are complex and varied. But this
summary suggests that the existence of judicial review under the Constitution has not had the major or dominant influence that many American scholars claim. Before drawing out the implications of this
situation for interpretation theory, it is instructive to comment briefly
on the actual social consequences of law, particularly judge-made law.
IV. THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LAW
Modem scholastic orthodoxy assumes the instrumental effect of
legal precepts and decisions. The little empirical work carried out indicates that the social impact of law has been vastly overestimated by
lawyers.3 6 What impact there is can be more accurately attributed to
legislative and regulatory intervention than to judicial activity.37 At
31. H. Arthurs, Protection Against Judicial Review 7 (July 1982) (unpublished manuscript).
32. [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
33. Id at 169-70.
34. See Re Racal Communications Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 634, 636 (H.L.).
35. See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (1610).
36. See, e.g., Macauley, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
37. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717,
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best, the direct effect of legal rules on public officials and private citizens is problematic. Furthermore, lawyers often assume that the impact will result in the intended conforming behavior. Initial research
suggests that the impact of law is as likely to be indirect and unintended as direct and intended.38 The indeterminancy of the courts' educational effect is underlined by Marc Galanter:
[This model of the courts as engineers of control through deliberately projected images is as illusionary and partial as that of courts as
authoritative resolvers of disputes . . . IThe messages disseminated by courts do not carry endowments or produce effects except as
they are received, interpreted and used by (potential) actors. Therefore the meaning of judicial signals is dependent on the information,
experience, skill and resources that disputants bring to them.39
One of the most documented areas is that of judicial attempts to
curb and control police conduct. Most studies reveal that such judicial
activity has failed to improve police practices and, in some instances,
has actually encouraged police perjury.40 Another revealing illustration is institutional reform litigation. Despite positive judicial pronouncements, many judicial decrees have not been implemented 4" and
actual prison conditions remain appalling.4" Similarly, as regards
mental institutions, many of the consequences of judicial intervention
have been detrimental.4 3 For instance, the aftermath of Wyatt v.
Stickney" is far from reassuring for traditional scholars. 4a Although
1744-51 (1982) (in tort and contract law the greatest effects come from legislative and regulatory
intervention rather than judicial decisions); Griffiths, Is Law Important?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 339,
351-56 (1979) (although legal rules do have some effects the extent and type are difficult to
ascertain).
38. See, e.g., Ross, The ScandinavianMyth: The Effectiveness ofDrinking-and-DrivingLegislation in Sweden and Norway, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1975) (concluding that there is little solid
support for the belief that Scandinavian drunk driving laws deter drunk driving).
39. Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms.- Courts, PrivateOrdering,andIndigenousLaw, 19 J. OF
L. PLURALISM 1, 32 (1981).
40. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
41. See Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a JudicialDecree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1345 n.31 (1975) (citing McDonald, Enforcing the Prison Desegregation Decree (unpublished paper delivered at All ACLU Lawyers' Conference, Mar. 24, 1973) (on
file with Yale Law Journal)).
42. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 75-80

(1981).
43. See, e.g., Note, supranote 41, at 1355 (premature discharge of patients).
44. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
45. Michael Perry directly addresses institutional reform litigation. See M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). His discussion is ambivalent. While
he recognizes the continuingdreadfulness of conditions in many prisons and hospitals, he still
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often hailed as a milestone in American constitutional jurisprudence,
its practical implementation leaves much to be desired. While there
were some improvements, a large disparity remains between actual
practice and the standards laid down by the courts.4 6 Indeed, an Alabamian clinician claims that ten years after Judge Johnson's decree,
"the state of Alabama has still not rectified the deficiencies that existed
when the litigation began."4 7 The Wyatt experience underscores the
fact that while publicized litigation can powerfully enrich and galvanize debate, its impact on actual social conditions is limited and ambiguous. As Leaf and Holt conclude:
The history of the Wyatt case also demonstrates that structural
changes within psychiatric and retardation facilities are not sufficient
to generate a humane and effective system of care. The Alabama experience suggests that while vast improvements can be made in the
manner in which society deals with the mentally ill, humane treatment can only exist when there is concern4 8about the needs of an individual, not a concern about procedures.
Many legal commentators more confidently point to the courts'
contribution over the past thirty years to the radical improvement of
the race and gender discrimination problem in the United States.
However, leaving aside the doctrinal development of procedural rights,
the substantive impact on society is limited at best. Some hard facts
make for distressing reading: the poorest fifth of the population receive
a smaller percentage of total after-tax income than almost anywhere
else in the industrial world; the poverty rate for black Americans is
three times that of the rate for white Americans; earnings for full-time
working women are less than sixty percent of men's and this percentage
has actually decreased over the last thirty years; nonwhite American
men earn about eighty percent of the earnings of equivalent white
Americans; the income gap between white and black American families has widened since 1977; and, not only is the unemployment rate
among black Americans more than double that for white Americans,
characterizes this litigation as representing "one of the most important recent developments in
constitutional law." Id. at 146; see generalo id at 146-51. Despite his passionate indictment of
such a state of institutional affairs, he ultimately glosses over the problems of effectiveness and
falls back on the position that the courts do as good a job as the legislative or executive branch of
government. Yet it is the ineffectiveness of those very branches that are said to justify judicial
involvement and activism in the first place.
46. See Note, supranote 41, at 1378.
47. Leaf & Holt, How Wyatt Affected Patients,in WYATT7 Y SrICxNEY. RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT 49, 50 (1981).

48. Id. at 105-06.
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but this unemployment inequality has itself doubled in the last thirty

years.49 The gap between legal change and social change is striking.
The rosy picture of social life drawn by the legal materials is far re-

moved from its sombre actuality.
V.

THE HERMENEUTIC CONNECTION

What has all this discussion to do with interpretation? How does

any of this comparative analysis or social data relate to the legal hermeneutical enterprise? Not surprisingly, I contend that it is extremely

pertinent. This new cult of "jurisgenesis"' 0 is simply the most recent
indulgence by legal scholars. It is a weak attempt to draw attention

away from the marginal importance of constitutional adjudication and
to establish constitutional scholarship as an intellectually rigorous endeavour distinct in kind to political prophecy. To separate debates
over interpretive strategies from their political ramifications is a convenient, but artificial and illegitimate move. All criticism and interpreta-

tion, legal or otherwise, "have a deep and complex relation with
politics,
the structures of power and social value that organize human
51
life."

In this sense, Fish and Michael's epistemological attack is dangerous, as it encourages the false belief that politics and legal interpreta-

tion can remain intellectually separate. 2 Fish is suspiciously and
uncharacteristically reticent about the political foundations of his interpretive theory. At the very least, he must offer some explanation for
the direction and dynamics of changes in the collusive conventions that

comprise the interpretive community. Also, the extant matrix of interpretive strategies cannot be monolithic. At the periphery, these must be
vague, half-formed or half-discarded conventions. Unless he wishes to
49. J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 30-32 (1983). They rely on official sources for
their statistics. The Brown saga still manages to plague the courts thirty years after its "momentous" resolution. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979) (seeking intervention in original Topeka desegregation case on behalf of class represented by Linda Brown's
daughter); Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983) (continuation of Little Rock
desegregation case). Like Dickens' Jarndyce andJarndyce,this affair "drones on" and "still drags
its dreary length before the Court." C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 4-5 (1853).
50. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983) ("the creation of legal
meaning").
51. Mitchell, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 1, 1 (1983).
52. See Bruns, Law as Hermeneutics: A Response to Ronald Dworkin, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERPRETATION 315, 319 (1983); Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to HistoricalDeconstruction,94 YALE L.J. 211 (1984); A. Hutchinson, Power and Interpretation (Or an Essay on How
to Make Bouillabaisse) (Jan. 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Southern California
Law Review).
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embrace some mystical theory of change, Fish must come clean on his
assumptions about language, power and society. Law is politics, and
legal scholarship must embrace, not eschew, that insight.
Needless to say, it would be absurd for me to conclude that since I
met Owen Fiss, Sanford Levinson, Mark Tushnet, and Michael Perry
at the University of Southern California, they all live in Los Angeles.
Similarly, it is a mistake to assume that since we met at an "Interpretation Symposium," we all treated interpretation as an autonomous intellectual and apolitical concern. Just as Fiss, Levinson, Tushnet, and
Perry came from, and will go back to, different parts of the United
States, so they came to the discussion of interpretation from very different political perspectives and will return to their political agendas after
the interpretation debate is over. I have tried to show how the debate
over whether an originalist or nonoriginalist, interpretavist or noninterpretavist, literalist or functionalist approach ought to be taken, while
fascinating, is of secondary importance. With no Bill of Rights and
with no institution of judicial review, other countries have reached
broadly similar results. Furthermore, the substantive impact of much
constitutional adjudication has been highly exaggerated.
Of course, this does not make law or legal scholarship irrelevant.
They remain important as symbolic institutions and serve a powerful
function as such. For some, the discrepancy between legal doctrine
and social practice is unfortunate, but does not fatally impair the operation of the courts as the nation's conscience; they can still meet "the
challenge of making the standards that govern our collective life articulate, coherent and effective." 53 Others, including myself, take a less benign view. The symbolism is offensive and amounts to nothing more
than a ritualistic reaffirmation of some vague commitment to justice
and fairness." Indeed, such symbolism may have a marked negative
effect; it tends to persuade people to believe that things are being done.
This may serve to frustrate reformative energy and relieve other governmental institutions from the pressures and responsibility of initiating and facilitating social change.
Contemporary society is characterized by inequality and domination. The enterprises of adjudication and legal scholarship merely
serve to clothe this political organization with the essential garments of
53. Dworkin, "Natural"Law Revisited,34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 187 (1982).
54. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 30 (arguing that the practices of the Ideology of Advocacy are inconsistent with
those practices' justifying values of autonomy, responsibility, and dignity).
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political legitimacy. They help transform the jungle of social order into
a civilized world of legal right. Legal thought helps to suppress these
distressing facts of social life. At bottom, legal discourse is a stylized
version of ideological obfuscation.
CONCLUSION
Still, I remain excited and attracted to American scholarship.
Moreover, it does not hold a monopoly over the "adjudication obsession"; British and Canadian academics are equally preoccupied with
the doctrinal product of the courts. Fortunately, in America there is a
growing debate over many of these issues." As Alexander Pope observed, "what mighty contests rise from trivial things. '5 6 So much valuable energy and juristic ability is presently employed in the
interpretative debate. The cause of social justice would be so much
better served if even a small part of those resources were shifted to
more concrete or constructive concerns. This statement is not an indictment of theory generally, but only of its present performance. Insofar as contemporary theorizing drifts free of social practice or historical
57
circumstance, it loses all claim to theoretical respectability or validity.
I am generally optimistic that American legal scholarship will better utilize its immense talents. As interesting as this symposium has
been, I hope that it marks the end of the present phase of the interpretation debate and helps to usher in fresh exchanges over the politics of
interpretation. Yet, in my more pessimistic moments, I am haunted by
the "alien" words of Robert Pirsig:
To tear down a factory or to revolt against a government because it is.
a system is to attack effects rather than causes; and as long as the
attack is upon effects only, no change is possible. The true system,
the real system, is our present construction of systematic thought itself, and if a factory is torn down but the rationality that produced it
is left standing, then the rationality will simply produce another factory. If a revolution destroys a systematic government, but the systematic patterns of thought that produced the government are left
intact, then those patterns will repeat themselves in the succeeding
so much talk about the system and so little
government. There's
58
understanding.
55.
56.
57.

See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1.
Rape of the Lock (1712) Canto 1, line 1.
See Hutchinson, supra note 52.
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